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Genetically Modified Crops, Agricultural Sustainability and 
National Opt-Outs – Enclosure as the Loophole? 
Mary Dobbs* 
Abstract 
EU Member States are faced with a quandary – after decades of demanding powers to choose 
whether to cultivate genetically modified (GM) crops or not, the EU has returned some 
limited but significant powers to them for the time since the area was regulated. A 2015 EU 
Directive permits Member States to ‘opt-out’ from GM cultivation, provided that they fulfil 
relevant criteria. Member States need to decide urgently and carefully whether and how to 
restrict GM crops, as the permeable nature of the environment facilitates the spread of GMOs 
once cultivated. A potential and significant consideration is agricultural sustainability (agri-
sustainability). In principle GM crops could promote agri-sustainability, including through 
increasing agricultural biodiversity (agrobiodiversity) as they facilitate introducing new 
traits or species into an ecosystem. However, the nature of their modifications allows for the 
applicability of patenting law, which enables the legal ‘enclosure’ of the crops’ genetic make-
up. This impacts negatively upon the long-term availability of plant genetic resources and 
agrobiodiversity, primarily as farmers and other breeders operate in a context where 
accidental cultivation of patented material can still attract liability. This article argues that 
legal enclosure could justify imposing restrictions on GM cultivation, in order to conserve 
agrobiodiversity as an exhaustible natural resource essential to agri-sustainability. To 
improve the likelihood of restrictions being upheld legally at both the EU and WTO level, 
such justifications must be distinguished clearly from any broader environmental concerns. 
This is as both the EU and WTO impose stringent restrictions where environmental objectives 
are raised. 
 
Keywords: Agricultural sustainability; enclosure; genetically modified crops; opt-outs; 
exhaustible natural resources. 
1. Introduction 
This article investigates whether the impact of ‘legal enclosure’ of plant genetic 
resources on agri-sustainability can justify the imposition of restrictions on 
genetically modified (GM) crops at both the EU and WTO level. It does so in the 
context of a new EU ‘opt-out’ clause for Member States, which creates the possibility 
of objectively justifying restrictions on GM cultivation. 
 
Agri-sustainability is not merely an ideal but a fundamental requirement if global 
food needs are to be met for current and future generations. Within the EU, the need 
for agri-sustainability can be found reflected in core Common Agricultural Policy 
reform documents, 1 the EU 2020 strategy 2 and the establishment of an European                                                         
*The research for this article was supported by a British Academy/Leverhulme Small Research Grant 
and was the basis for a paper presented at the UCC Law and Environment Conference 2016. It was 
further influenced by the Queen’s University Belfast workshop on ‘Innovative Approaches to 
Ecological Sustainability’ within the Jean Monnet Project ‘Tensions at the Fringes of Europe’. My 
thanks to those who participated in the interviews and surveys, as well as to those at the UCC 
conference and QUB workshop, Prof. Ronan Deazley, Dr. Brian Jack and other colleagues who 
provided valuable feedback. Any errors are the author’s. 
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Innovation Partnership on ‘Agricultural Productivity and Sustainability’.3 It is linked 
inherently to objectives of food security and food sovereignty, with ‘sustainable 
intensification’4 as the central tenet. Yet, we continue to see serious environmental 
degradation, biodiversity loss, crop disasters, famine and other key indicators that 
agri-sustainability is not common practice. Further, increased stressors will arise with 
climate change, as the environmental and climatic conditions change more rapidly 
than plants can adapt, which emphasizes the urgency of addressing agri- 
sustainability.5  
 
The issue of genetically modified (GM) crops arises within this context. As with 
plants that have been developed through more traditional breeding, these plants have 
the potential to impact significantly upon agri-sustainability and the related issues of 
food security and sovereignty 6  – whether positively or negatively. However, the 
nature of their modifications (direct modification of the genome, including across 
species) brings with it further important scientific and legal considerations, including 
the potential for ‘enclosure’ of plant genetic material. 7  Enclosure involves the 
corralling of apparently public or common goods in order to transform them into 
private goods. 8  Enclosure of genetic material is relevant not merely to debates 
regarding the rights of subsistence farmers/peasants, accumulation by corporations or 
indeed the theoretical elements of enclosure of a public good to create a private good. 
It also has knock-on effects on agri-sustainability and issues such as food security and 
food sovereignty, especially through impacting upon agricultural biodiversity 
(agrobiodiversity). This is as farmers and other breeders are restricted in their use of 
plant genetic resources in the short-term, with further long-term impacts on the 
existence of plant genetic resources also – most obviously, if farmers and breeders 
have a smaller pool from which to grow or breed crops, then this reduces the 
opportunity for genetic diversity to develop. However, there is also the risk of being 
held liable for accidental cultivation of patented traits. 9  As the release of plant 
material cannot easily be undone and existing property rights are not lightly restricted, 
careful consideration of the desirability of such an occurrence is required in the first                                                                                                                                                               
1  Communication, ‘The CAP towards 2020: Meeting the food, natural resources and territorial 
challenges of the future’, COM(2010)672 final; and Regulation 1305/2013/EU on support for rural 
development by the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1698/2005, [2013] OJ L347/487. 
2 COM(2010)2020, “Europe 2020 – A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth”, at 16. 
3  COM(2012) 79, “ The European Innovation Partnership ‘Agricultural Productivity and 
Sustainability”. 
4 Royal Society, Reaping the benefits: Science and the sustainable intensification of global agricultural 
(London, 2009). 
5  Lin, “Resilience in Agriculture through Crop Diversification: Adaptive Management for 
Environmental Change”, OJBS (2011), 183-193. 
6 E.g. Tait and Barker, “Global food security and the governance of modern technologies”, 12:8 EMBO 
Reports (2011), 763; and Azadi and Ho, “Genetically modified and organic crops in developing 
countries: A review of options for food security”, 28:1 Biotechnology Advances (2010), 160-168. 
7 Lee and Burrell, “Liability for the Escape of GM Seeds: Pursuing the ‘Victim’?”, 65:4 Modern Law 
Review (2002), 517-537; Peekhaus, “Primitive Accumulation and Enclosure of the Commons: 
Genetically Engineered Seeds and Canadian Jurisprudence”, 75:4 Science and Society (2011), 529; 
Shand, “New Enclosures: Why civil society and governments need to look beyond life patenting”, 
3   Centennial Rev. (2003), 187; and National Research Council, Biological Confinement of 
Genetically Engineered Crops, (Washington DC, The National Academies Press, 2004), 65-129, 
regarding bioconfinement mechanisms. 
8 Cowan, Fox O’Mahony and Cobb, Land Law (2nd edn, Palgrave, 2016), 143-4. 
9 See Section 3. 
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instance. Should enclosure of plant genetic material be facilitated to the extent 
currently possible? 
 
Consideration of this issue in the EU context is increasingly relevant due to 
significant on-going changes within the EU GM cultivation regime. The overall EU 
GM cultivation regime is regulated by Directive 2001/18, 10 which provides for a 
maximum harmonisation approach that facilitates EU level authorisation of the 
cultivation of new GM crops based on a risk assessment. Once authorised, in line with 
the free movement of goods within the EU, Member State may not hinder the 
circulation and cultivation of these crops except in accordance with EU law. 11 
However, in March 2015, Directive 2015/412/EU 12  was adopted as a result of 
significant internal and external pressures. 13  In an exceptional act of partial de-
harmonisation, the Directive restores some unilateral powers to Member States to 
restrict the cultivation of individual GM crops (to ‘opt-out’) if they so wish. During 
the transitional period (April-October 2015) and future (re)authorisation periods, 
Member States can request a voluntary geographic restriction by the notifiers. 
However, any other restrictions must be objectively justified, as outlined in Section 4 
below.14 In doing so, the Member States must still comply with EU law and they must 
also bear in mind obligations under international law.15 Consequently, Member States 
and regions are currently considering very carefully who should be responsible for 
Directive 2015/412,16 whether to implement it and, if so, how – with no quick-fix 
solution. 
 
Indeed, whilst 19 of the 28 Member States availed of the opt-out clause during the 
transitional period between April and October 2015,17 the varying reasoning behind 
the decisions to avail or not of the clause highlights the challenge for its 
implementation.18 For some, this was merely a stopgap measure to provide time to                                                         
10 Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 March 2001 on the 
deliberate release into the environment of genetically modified organisms and repealing Council 
Directive 90/220/EEC, O.J. 2001, L106/1. 
11 Lee, EU Environmental Law, Governance and Decision-Making, (2nd edn, Hart 2014) 237–8 and 
246; and de Sadeleer, EU Environmental Law and the Internal Market, (OUP 2014) 249–300 and 349–
382.    
12 Directive 2015/412/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2015 amending 
Directive 2001/18/EC as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the 
cultivation of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) in their territory O.J. 2015, L68/1. 
13 E.g. Randour, Janssens and Delreux, “The Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms in the 
European Union: a Necessary Trade-Off?” 52 JCMS (2014), 1307-1323. 
14  See also Dobbs, “Attaining Subsidiarity-Based Multilevel Governance of Genetically Modified 
Cultivation?”, 28:2 Journal of Environmental Law, (2016) 245-273, at 264-6. 
15 The WTO is of particular significance to the EU, as highlighted by the Biotech Dispute European 
Communities — Measures Affecting the   Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, 
WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R, [2006] 3 DSR 847 (EC Biotech); and Randour, Janssens and Delreux, 
op. cit. supra note13. 
16 In particular, for some States such as Germany, Italy, Belgium and the UK, their federal make-up 
leads to a complicated internal multi-level division of powers that are relevant to the clause. 
17 See http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/cultivation/geographical_scope_en.htm. 
18 In order to gain insight into the reasoning of such decisions, as well as into the potential future 
implementation of the clause, the author undertook empirical research with representatives of both the 
Member States and the Regions between May 2015 and July 2016. This encompassed: (a) oral and 
email interviews with representatives from 8 of the 19 Member States who availed of the opt-out clause 
(for some or all of the State), as well as with 1 representative from a Member State that declined to 
avail of the clause; (b) written communications with representatives of 3 Member States that did not 
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evaluate the situation further – at least two Member States had no specific objections 
to GM crops but wanted time to consider whether to facilitate GM crops or not and 
also wanted to avoid providing a precedent for allowing future GM crops.19 Other 
Member States and regions had a range of reasons for availing of the clause, including 
a ‘green image’, distrust of GM technology, public opinion, environmental concerns 
and concerns over the challenge to prevent the presence of GMOs in non-GM crops 
(admixture). 20  However, many of these Member States and regions remained 
uncertain as to how they would implement the Directive in the future and whether 
their concerns could translate into legal justifications upon which to found their 
restrictions. Even amongst those States who did not avail of the opt-out clause on this 
occasion were those who were still debating how to transpose and potentially 
implement the legislation, having not ruled out its application in the future. It is worth 
noting that the challenge for Member States to identify a relevant objective 
justification is increased as reliance on purely economic concerns is excluded and 
reliance on environmental concerns is heavily restricted due to the level of 
harmonisation of environmental protection. It is for this reason, along with the 
significance of agri-sustainability in its own right, that the focus herein is upon agri-
sustainability rather than environmental sustainability. 
 
We see therefore that the EU Member States are faced with new powers to restrict 
GM cultivation for the first time since the EU regulated the area – powers that are 
significant, uncertain and challenging. However, it is also important to note that the 
European Commission’s hope was that the powers would appease Member States 
sufficiently in order to facilitate the EU level authorisation of future GM crops that 
receive a positive risk assessment during the authorisation process. 21  Therefore, 
Member States may be faced repeatedly with the choice of whether to avail of the opt-
out clause or not. 
 
In light of concerns over food security and the urgency for EU Member States to 
determine how they will treat GM crops, this article considers the challenges that GM 
crops pose for agri-sustainability. Specifically, it argues that legal enclosure could 
have a profound negative impact upon agri-sustainability, which can justify EU 
Member States in imposing restrictions upon GM cultivation at both the EU and 
WTO levels. However, the States will need to maintain a clear focus on agri-
sustainability rather than the closely related issue of environmental sustainability, as 
the EU and WTO legal frameworks impose further conditions where broader 
environmental concerns are raised.  
                                                                                                                                                              
avail of the clause; (c) oral and email interviews with representatives of 4 individual regions, one of 
whom is a representative of the GM-Free Regions Network; and (d) written questionnaires completed 
by representatives of regions in the GM-Free Regions Network (insufficient number to provide 
statistically significant date, but with some valuable qualitative material). There was some overlap 
within these, as 2 of the Member State representatives interviewed (a) were also simultaneously 
representatives of the regions (c). Representatives were those at the national or regional level with 
expertise and responsibilities in the area, e.g. Ministers, COREPER Ambassadors, and senior 
departmental members. 
19 Empirical data gathered, ibid. 
20 Empirical data gathered, ibid. 
21 Randour, Janssens and Delreux, op. cit. supra note13. 
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In making these arguments, this article builds upon existing literature on legal 
enclosure22 of plant genetic resources,23 in order to consider both the attachment of 
the patent to the crop’s progeny and the multiple impacts upon agri-sustainability. 
Further, it builds upon initial forays by authors such as Weimer and Lee on the new 
EU opt-out clause,24 by investigating in-depth the potential of agri-sustainability and 
its links with the concept of ‘exhaustible natural resources’ at the WTO level to 
justify national restrictions of GM crops. A significant issue at any stage, the context 
of the new opt-outs heightens the urgency of such an analysis for the Member States 
and broader society. 
 
2. Agri-sustainability and genetic diversity 
So what then does agri-sustainability involve? It essentially is the long game for 
agricultural production, which attempts to reconcile25 the potentially competing goals 
of agricultural intensification 26  to meet increasing demands for global food 
production27 with that of sustainability.28 It recognises the need to adapt agricultural 
production to produce more food in an environmentally friendly and sustainable 
manner.29 It includes consideration of how agriculture operates within an ecosystem30 
and very careful management of resources, e.g. water31 and soil biodiversity.32 
 
Of particular significance to us is the need for biodiversity33 and, within that, genetic 
diversity.34 This is fundamental to agri-sustainability,35 and thereby food security and 
                                                        
22 Legal enclosure is used explicitly in Lobel, “The New Cognitive Property: Human Capital Law and 
the Reach of Intellectual Property” (2015) 93 Texas Law Review, 789 at 841, when referring to 
Boyle’s analysis of the impact of intellectual property law generally in “The Second Enclosure 
Movement and the Construction of Public Domain”, 66 Law and Contemp. Probs. (2003), 33.  
23 See references, supra note 7. 
24 Weimer, “The Right to Adopt Post-Market Restrictions of Genetically Modified Crops in the EU - A 
Shift from De-Centralised Multi-Level to Centralised Governance in the Case of GM Foods”, 3 EJRR 
(2012), 445; and Lee, “GMOs in the Internal Market: New Legislation on National Flexibility” 79:2 
Modern Law Review (2016), 317. 
25 Brussaard et al, “Reconciling biodiversity conservation and food security: scientific challenges for a 
new agriculture”, 2:1 Current Opinion in Environmental Sustainability (2010), 34-42. 
26 Dillon et al, “Measuring progress in agricultural sustainability to support policy-making”, 14:1 
International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability (2016) 31-44, at 31-2; and Carter and Clarke, “How 
Has Plant Breeding Contributed to Agricultural Sustainability”, 26:6 Outlooks on Pest Management 
(2015), 248-251. 
27 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, How to feed the world in 2050, Rome, 12-13 October, 2009. 
28 Dresner, The Principles of Sustainability, (2nd edn, Earthscan, 2008). 
29 Royal Society, op. cit. supra note4. 
30 Hauptli et al, “Biotechnology and Crop Breeding For Sustainable Agriculture” in Edwards et al 
(eds.), Sustainable Agricultural Systems, (Soil and Water Conservation Society, 1990), at 143-4. 
31 Garcia-Tejero, Durán-Zuazo and Muriel-Fernández, “Towards sustainable irrigated Mediterranean 
agriculture: implications for water conservation in semi-arid environments” 39:5 Water International 
(2014), 635-648. 
32  Brussaard, de Ruiter and Brown, “Soil Biodiversity for Agricultural Sustainability”, 121:3 
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment (2007), 233-244. 
33 Bàrberi, “Functional Agrobiodiversity: The Key to Sustainability” in Bhulllar and Bhullar (eds.), 
Agricultural Sustainability: Progress and Prospects in Crop Research, (Elsevier, 2013). 
34 E.g. Article 2 of the Convention on Biological Diversity; and Moffet and Bregha, “The Role of Law 
in the Promotion of Sustainable Development” 6 J Envtl L & Prac (1996), 1, 5. 
35  E.g. Frison, Cherfas and Hodgkin, “Agricultural Biodiversity is Essential for a Sustainable 
Improvement in Food and Nutrition Security” 3 Sustainability (2011), 238-253. 
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sovereignty. 36 It helps reduce the potential for the collapse of entire agricultural 
systems for instance in the case of disease, drought or pest;37 genetic diversity may 
mean that some crop varieties are grown that provide lower yields or are not as 
popular with producers or consumers for some reason, but it also leads to risk 
diversification. 38 Furthermore, it enables the development of further advantageous 
traits, which may then be protected and cultivated further, as reflected in the 
successful breeding of high yielding and nutritious crops throughout history and the 
gathering of plant genetic resources from other biospheres with extensive diversity 
(‘biopiracy’ and ‘bioprospecting’).39 In some instances, these resources may as of yet 
be entirely untapped or their specific significance unknown40 and therefore we may 
not actively be trying to protect them. Hence, Article 8 of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity imposes upon Contracting Parties the obligation to ‘[r]egulate or 
manage biological resources important for the conservation of biological diversity… 
with a view to ensuring their conservation and sustainable use.’  
 
At first sight genetic diversity is assured, since plants by their very nature involve 
living organisms that propagate and lead to the dispersal of their genetic material. 
Indeed, genetic diversity can be enabled through a wide range of mechanisms, 
including natural mechanisms such as wind pollination, bee pollination or dispersal of 
genetic material by birds and animals. Daily agricultural practices, i.e. ‘on-farm’ 
activities can also play a significant role in developing genetic diversity and 
promoting agri-sustainability. 41  For instance, this can be via seed-saving and 
exchange between farmers leading to the gradual alteration of the plants’ genetic 
make-up, 42  or indeed the introduction of entirely new crops or varieties into a 
different locale. Further, intentional breeding or genetic modification can lead to the 
development of new varieties or traits, based on a varied genetic make-up. 
Consequently, the development and maintenance of genetic diversity appears to be 
promoted by both nature and humankind. 
 
However, the promotion of genetic diversity is not as certain as it might appear. 
Whilst development of new plant genetic resources continues, much of the existing 
diversity is disappearing. In particular, one of the challenges posed by our society is 
                                                        
36 FAO, ‘Rome Declaration on World Food Security’, World Food Summit, Rome, 13-17 November 
1996, Target 13: ‘Maintain genetic diversity of agro-plants, domesticated animals and miminizing 
genetic erosion’; and Frison et al, ibid.  
37 E.g. Wolfe, “Crop strength through diversity”, 406 Nature (2000) 681; and Ceccarelli et al, “Plant 
Genetic Resources and Plant Improvement as Tools to Develop Sustainable Agriculture” 28:1 
Experimental Agriculture (1992), 89. 
38  Lin, “Resilience in Agriculture through Crop Diversification: Adaptive Management for 
Environmental Change” (2011) OJBS 183. 
39 Macilwain, “When rhetoric hits reality in debate on bioprospecting” (1998) 392 Nature 535. 
40 Hoisington, “Plant genetic resources: What can they contribute toward increased crop productivity” 
(1999) Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 5937; and 
Zamir, “Improving plant breeding with exotic genetic libraries” (2001) Nature Reviews Genetics 983. 
41 Brush, “The issues of in situ conservation of crop genetic resources” in Brush (ed.), Genes in the 
Field: On-Farm Conservation of Crop Diversity’ (Lewis Publishers, International Development 
Research Centre and International Plant Genetic Research Institute, 2000). 
42 Chiarolla, Intellectual Property, Agriculture and Global Food Security: The privatization of crop 
diversity, (Edward Elgar, 2011), 52; and Blakeney, Intellectual Property Rights and Food Security, 
(2009, CABI), 125. 
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the industrialisation of agriculture and the push towards monoculture approaches.43 
This is due to a range of factors, including environmental stresses, control of seed 
banks and supplies by large corporations,44 the reduced role of on-farm development 
and the desire to cultivate ‘improved’ crops or only the most competitive varieties 
available. Indeed, whilst genetic diversity as a whole may not have undergone a 
substantial reduction, bearing in mind the creation of gene banks,45 genetic diversity 
within individual crops grown in individual countries has decreased dramatically and 
there is far greater reliance upon released varieties. 46  For instance, a Rural 
Advancement Fund International study on diversity in the United States discovered 
that there has been a loss of 86.2% and 87.7% of apple and pear varieties between 
1804 and 1904. 47 On the vegetable front, the study concluded that there has been a 
loss of at least 80% for 72 of 75 vegetable varieties in the United States between 1903 
and 1983. 48 However, erosion extends beyond the United States and other developed 
countries. An FAO Report in 2010 stated in relation to wheat cultivation globally that 
‘[t]he instances of absence of genetic erosion or lack of vulnerability are rare.’49 Even 
allowing for potential errors in calculating erosion, this is a worrying situation for 
society. 
 
Consequently, if we are to analyse GM crops in light of agri-sustainability, then we 
must necessarily consider their impact upon biodiversity and specifically upon genetic 
diversity – this is not merely their impact upon the existence of diversity in principle 
but the presence in situ and ‘access to a wide range of genetic diversity’50 (emphasis 
added) currently and in the future that are essential to agri-sustainability. Whilst 
intentional breeding and modification play an important role in the development of 
new varieties and traits, the role of on-farm practices and development should not be 
underestimated or ignored. ‘Breeder concentration’ and the reduction of seed-saving 
                                                        
43  E.g. Rosset and Altieri, “Agroecology versus Input Substitution: Fundamental Contradiction of 
Sustainable Agriculture” (1997) 10:3 Society and Natural Resources, 283. 
44 The control by private companies over plants and their genetic material has increased significantly in 
recent years, with the majority of global seed sales now controlled by 10 companies. E.g. ETC Group, 
‘Who owns nature? Corporate power and the final frontier in the commodification of life’ (2008), 
Winnepeg, MB, 11-3, available at: 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/publication/707/01/etc_won_report_final_color.
pdf. This market share had reached over 75% in 2011: ETC Group, ‘Putting the Cartel before the 
Horse… and Farm, Seeds, Soil, Peasants, etc.: Who will control agricultural impacts, 2013?’ (2013) 
Communiqué 111, available at 
http://www.etcgroup.org/sites/www.etcgroup.org/files/CartelBeforeHorse11Sep2013.pdf. See also J. 
Fernandez-Cornejo and Just, “Researchability of Modern Agricultural Input Markets and Growing 
Concentration” (2007) 89:5 American Journal of Agricultural Economics 1269, at 1270-1. 
45 FAO Second Report on the ‘State of the world’s plant genetic resources for food and agriculture’ 
Rome, 26 October 2010, 17. 
46 FAO, ibid; Heinemann et al, “Sustainability and innovation in staple crop production in the US 
Midwest” (2014) 12:1 International Journal of Agricultural Sustainability 71, at 78-9; and Thrupp, 
“Linking agricultural biodiversity and food security: the valuable role of agrobiodiversity for 
sustainable agriculture” (2000) 76:2 International Affairs 265, at 269-271. 
47  Fowler and Mooney, The Threatened Gene: Food, Politics and the Loss of Genetic Diversity, 
(Lutterworth Press, 1990), 63. 
48 Fowler and Mooney, ibid, 63-7. 
49 FAO op. cit. supra note 45, 312. 
50 Visser and Louwaars, ‘The contribution of plant genetic resources to food security’ in Rayfuse and 
Weisfelt (eds.), The Challenge of Food Security, (Edward Elgar, 2012), 114. 
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and exchange can pose serious threats to agrobiodiversity and thereby agri-
sustainability.51  
 
3. Relationship of GM Crops with Agri-sustainability   
There is as yet no clear evidence as to whether GM crops and biotechnology impact 
positively or negatively upon agrobiodiversity and agri-sustainability.52 The crucial 
thing from the perspective of agri-sustainability is not to reject options, including GM 
crops, from ideological bases,53 but instead to consider the very practical impact upon 
sustainability due for instance to the nature of the crops, the surrounding practices and 
the legal rules that apply. 
 
GM crops involve the amendment of the genome within the crop based on scientific 
research, typically in order to develop a new advantageous trait. This can even 
involve introducing materials from other species. Thereby they automatically would 
increase the potential for diversity, similarly to traditional forms of breeding and seed-
exchange. Furthermore, the modification could enable crops to be grown in different 
locations, e.g. to be drought-resistant.54 Alternatively the modification could be such 
as to reduce the need for intensification, e.g. through increasing the yield or 
nutritional quality of the crop,55 or to reduce the need for chemicals, e.g. through 
making a crop pest or disease resistant.56 Consequently, GM crops have the potential 
to impact positively upon agri-sustainability through a range of mechanisms.57 
 
However, GM crops also have the potential to pose threats to the environment and 
agri-sustainability, e.g. through the possibility for outcrossing of these advantageous 
traits to wild relatives leading to ‘superweeds’, encouraging heavy-handed spraying of 
pesticides where for instance the crops are ‘Roundup Ready’, or encouraging further 
intensification and monocultures in order to gain a temporary advantage. 58 The area 
is further complicated by the surrounding scientific uncertainty and hence the 
precautionary principle is applied.59 
 
                                                        
51 Heinemann et al, op. cit. supra note46, 71-4 and 78-82. 
52  E.g. Azadi et al, “Genetically Modified Crops: Towards Agricultural Growth, Agricultural 
Development, or Agricultural Sustainability?”, 31:3 Food Reviews International (2015), 195. 
53 Pretty et al, “Resource-Conserving Agriculture Increases Yields in Developing Countries”, 40:4 
Environmental Science and Technology (2006), 1114. 
54 E.g. Kasuga et al, “Improving plant drought, salt and freezing tolerance by gene transfer of single 
stress inducible transcription factor”, 17 Nature Biotechnology (1999), 287. 
55 E.g. Golden Rice containing beta-carotene: Gura, “New genes boost rice nutrients”, 285 Science 
no.5430 (1999), 994.    
56 E.g. Boulter, “Insect pest control by copying nature using genetically engineered crops”, 34 The 
International Journal of Plant Biochemistry (1993), 1453.  
57 Hauptli et al, op. cit. supra note30. 
58 E.g. Shelton, “Risks and Benefits of Agricultural Biotechnology”, in Ahmed (ed), Testing of GMOs 
in Food, (New York, Food Products Press, 2004); Ervin and Welsh, “Environmental Effects of GM 
Crops: Differentiated Risk Assessment and Management” in Wesseler (ed), Environmental Costs and 
Benefits of Transgenic Crops, (Dordrecht, Springer, 2005); and Young, Genetically Modified 
Organisms and Biosafety: A background paper for decision-makers and others to assist in 
consideration of GMO issues, (Cambridge, IUCN, 2004). 
59  M. Weimer, ‘Applying Precaution in EU Authorisation of Genetically Modified Products – 
Challenges and Suggestions for Reform’ (2010) European Law Journal 624. 
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Consequently, individual GM crops can impact both positively and negatively upon 
agricultural production and the environment, 60  and thereby agri-sustainability. 
However, it is the use of and control over GM crops as a whole that currently poses 
the greatest threat to agrobiodiversity and thereby agri-sustainability. This is through 
the potential for those developing GM crops to ‘enclose’ plant genetic material and 
thereby transform something that might be considered a public good into a private 
good, facilitating the exclusion of others. Whilst other plant genetic resources will 
continue to exist and develop independently, enclosure can spread via a range of 
mechanisms and typically will attach to crops with advantageous (and competitive) 
traits.   
 
Imprinting enclosure on seeds  
 
Seed companies and plant breeders are understandably protective of varieties and 
advantageous characteristics that they have developed through the considerable 
investment of resources. Bearing in mind the context of our market economy and the 
goal of wealth maximisation for companies, it is also hardly surprising that the 
companies attempt to control the supply and demand of plants, seeds and plant 
genetic material. Two specific mechanisms that companies avail of in order to protect 
their investments and gain control are biological confinement (bioconfinement) 
mechanisms and techno-legal mechanisms – enabling varying enclosure of plant 
genetic material.61  
 
Bioconfinement mechanisms involve adapting the plant’s genome in order to restrict 
the spread of genetic material and therefore would impact negatively on biodiversity. 
Existing practices include hybridisation where any progeny do not replicate the 
advantageous traits of the original generation, thereby encouraging repeat purchases 
of the seeds/plants.62 A more modern and absolute form of bioconfinement is that of 
‘Genetic Use Restriction Technologies’ (GURT).63 GURT, also known as ‘traitor’ 
and ‘terminator technologies’, involves the adaptation of the genome to restrict the 
manifestation or dispersal of an organism’s traits, including through plant sterility.64 
Unlike with legal mechanisms, if GURT is effective then the control is absolute65 and 
for instance breeders would be unable to avail of the genetic material to develop new 
plants. If it is partially ineffective, then sterility could spread to non-target organisms 
via outcrossing. In either situation, the actual genetic diversity present would be 
reduced. However, such is the controversy surrounding GURT that an international de 
facto moratorium on the use of terminator seeds has been in place since 2000.66                                                          
60 E.g. Applegate, “The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle to Harmonize the 
Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms”, 9 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. (2001), 207; and 
Wesseler (ed), Environmental Costs and Benefits of Transgenic Crops, (Dordrecht, Springer, 2005). 
61 See supra note7. 
62 Berlan and Lewontin, “The Political Economy of Hybrid Corn”, 38:3 Monthly Review (1986), 35. 
63 E.g. Hills et al, “Genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs): strategies to impede transgene 
movement”, 12:4 Trends in Plant Science (2007), 177. 
64 E.g. Kausch et al, “Transgenic perennial biofuel feedstocks and strategies for bioconfinement”, 1:1 
Biofuels (2010) 163, at 167-171; and Breyer et al, “Biosafety considerations associated with molecular 
farming in genetically modified plants”, 3:11 Journal of Medicinal Plants Research (2009), 825, at 831-
3. 
65 Shand, “New Enclosures: Why civil society and governments need to look beyond life patenting”, 
3   Centennial Rev. (2003) 187, at 192. 
66 Convention on Biological Diversity, Conference of the Parties 5, Decision V/5 at 23, available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=7147. This was subsequently confirmed at: Convention on 
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The companies are not left powerless however, as the law provides them with ample 
tools. Common legal mechanisms in this area include contracts and technology user 
agreements between the supplier and the farmer. These can encompass obligations to 
purchase other products from the supplier, not to save or exchange seeds, and so 
forth, 67  thereby increasing the control over the farmer and indirectly the market. 
However, the main legal mechanisms of relevance to us are sourced in intellectual 
property (IP) law and specifically patents.68  
 
Intellectual property rights (IPRs) permit the holder to exclude others from use of 
their IP in accordance with the relevant law and vary considerably depending on the 
IP tool in question. The aim is twofold and based in the recognition of the value of the 
products and the role of the individual/company in developing this product. Therefore 
IPRs aim to protect the investments of the individual/company who provided the 
resources (time, effort and money), thereby encouraging further beneficial activities 
including research and innovation.69 The fear is that without such protection, society 
would stagnate – IPRs provide an incentive to innovate. 
 
Consequently, although controversial due to claiming ownership over living material 
and excluding others from benefiting from what could be considered a public good or 
part of the ‘common heritage of mankind’, 70 international law provides for legal 
protection over living organisms, e.g. Article 16 of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, the International Union for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 
(UPOV) and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(the TRIPS Agreement).  The challenge then becomes to determine where the balance 
should lie between competing ownership claims. Whilst State and local community 
claims are relevant,71 frequently the focus is upon the initial breeder, any secondary 
breeders and farmers. In contrast with the International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
Resources for Food and Agriculture (Seeds Treaty), this balance tends to weigh in 
favour of the initial breeder, whose IPRs are being protected, although some 
flexibility does exist to alter that balance. 
 
In particular, TRIPS recognises the possibility of ownership claims over innovations 
in plants in the form of patents.72 Patents generally involve very strong controls that 
attach to inventions and exclude other parties from using these inventions other than 
with the consent of the patent holder for the duration of the patent. Applied to plants,                                                                                                                                                               
Biological Diversity, Conference of the Parties 8, Decision VIII/23 at C, available at: 
https://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/?id=11037. 
67  E.g. the 2015 Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement (Limited Use License) at 32 in 
particular, available at: http://www.monsanto.com/sitecollectiondocuments/technology-use-guide.pdf.  
68 A range of other mechanisms within IP law can be of use to the seed companies also, e.g. as outlined 
in Staub, “Intellectual Property Rights, Genetic Markers, and Hybrid Seed Production”, 1:2 Journal of 
New Seeds (1999), 39. 
69 Blakeney, op. cit. supra note42, 22. 
70  Gepts, “Who Owns Biodiversity, and How Should the Owners be Compensated?”, 134 Plant 
Physiology (2004), 1295; and Morales, “Intellectual Property in Living Organisms – Current Situation, 
Trends and Challenges” in Martínez-Piva (eds.), Knowledge Generation and Protection: Intellectual 
Property, Innovation and Economic Development (Springer, 2009), 216. 
71 E.g. protection of traditional knowledge in Cottier and Panizzon, “Legal Perspectives on traditional 
knowledge: the case for intellectual protection”, 7:2 Journal of International Economic Law (2004), 
371. 
72 Article 28 of TRIPS. 
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this includes (commercial or non-commercial) planting, saving, exchanging and re-
planting seeds of patented plants/plants containing the patented trait, as exemplified 
by cases such as Bowman v Monsanto73 and Schmeiser v Monsanto.74 A patent holder 
can charge a fee for such use, impose other conditions or refuse use – if an individual 
infringes the patent, they can be made pay damages (including all profits accrued 
through use of the product) or even hand over/destroy the relevant product. Therefore, 
where a patent is available, it can provide seed companies with extensive powers. 
However, TRIPS provides the Contracting Parties with considerable flexibility in 
their approach to patenting over living organisms75 and therefore much will depend 
on the approach taken nationally in implementing TRIPS. 
 
For instance, the United States of America permit both plant patents (asexually 
propagated plants) and utility patents (sexually propagated plants).76 In contrast the 
EU’s approach is seemingly less favourable to the patent holder: whilst the EU 
Biotech Directive77 and European Patent Convention78 permit patents that focus on 
the genetic modification itself within the seed or plant, 79 it excludes plant varieties.80 
Nonetheless, the EU regime still provides considerable powers to the patent holder 
and can endanger agrobiodiversity through its impact on other breeders and farmers. 
 
Firstly, in contrast with plant variety protection (PVP)81 where secondary breeders 
automatically have the right under EU law to develop further varieties without any fee 
applying,82 secondary breeders are faced with further costs where they wish to avail 
of patented organisms and for less reward. Secondary breeders may apply for a 
contractual licence or avail of Article 12 of the Biotech Directive to demand a 
compulsory licence in order develop new strains where criteria are met. However, as 
part of this, secondary breeders must pay a suitable royalty and agree to a cross-
licence for the patent holder. Essentially, it can become increasingly costly to engage 
in breeding, to the point that only large corporate entities may have the necessary 
resources to do so and still protect their interests.83                                                         
73  Bowman v Monsanto, Supreme Court of the United States, No. 11-796, 13 May 2013, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/12pdf/11-796_c07d.pdf.  
74 Monsanto Canada Inc v Schmeiser, [2004] 1 SCR 902. 
75 E.g. Article 30 of TRIPS. 
76  See generally: http://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/patent-basics/types-patent-
applications/general-information-about-35-usc-161.  
77 Articles 3 and 4.2 of Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 
1998 on the legal protection of biotechnological inventions, O.J. 1998, L213/13 (Biotech Directive). 
78 Article 52 of the Convention on the Grant of European Patents (European Patent Convention). 
79 E.g. Schertenleib, “The Patentability and Protection of Living Organisms in the European Union”, 
26:5 European Intellectual Property Review (2004), 203; “Broccoli II”, decision of the Enlarged Board 
of Appeal of 25 March 2015 in case G2/13, available at 
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=EXBZX31D2974684&number=EP99915886&lng=en
&npl=false; and “Tomato II”, decision of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of 25 March 2015 in case 
G2/12, available at 
https://register.epo.org/application?documentId=EXBZW10W4599684&number=EP00940724&lng=e
n&npl=false.  
80 Article 4.1 of the Biotech Directive; and Article 53(b) of the European Patent Convention. 
81 This is a form of intellectual property right that applies to plant varieties, i.e. groups of plants ‘within 
a single botanical taxon of the lowest known rank’ that share the same characteristics ‘from a given 
genotype or combination of genotypes’ (uniform), are distinct from other groups and are stable: Article 
5(2), Council Regulation (EC) No2100/94 on Community plant variety rights, [1994] OJ L227/1. 
82 Article 15, Regulation 2100/94 ibid 
83 E.g. Blakeney, op. cit. supra note42, 15. 
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Secondly, farmers who purchase the patented seeds/plants are also restricted in their 
actions. The de facto position under TRIPS and the EU Biotech Directive is that 
farmers may not impinge upon patent rights. Nonetheless, under Article 11 of the 
Biotech Directive a limited exemption does exist for farmers to save patented seed for 
their own use. Via Article 14 of the EU Regulation on Plant Variety Rights, small 
farmers of specific crops may save seed freely for their own use and other farmers 
may save seed upon paying an ‘equitable’ fee that is lower than the commercial rate. 
However, whether under TRIPS or under the EU Biotech Directive, no farmers may 
exchange patented seeds/plants with others.  
 
The accumulation of these factors has the potential to have a significant impact upon 
diversity. From a positive perspective, patent holders and potential future patent 
holders are strongly protected and may be encouraged to engage in further research, 
leading to further genetic diversity. Similarly, some on-farm diversity may develop, 
due to seed-saving and licenced breeding. However, access to the diversity is limited 
to those who are willing to purchase the patented seeds/crops in the first instance. 
Further, the financial benefits for others to save or breed patented seeds decrease with 
the need to pay fees and also royalties in the latter case. The exclusion of seed-
exchange also decreases the attractiveness of even seed-saving and reduces the 
dispersal of genetic material. Consequently, overall the on-farm diversity and 
especially the access to genetic diversity is likely to decrease.  
 
However, a third factor exacerbates the impact of patenting on agri-sustainability. 
Third party farmers may end up cultivating the original patented crops or the progeny 
containing the patented traits, without intentionally purchasing and sowing patented 
seeds. 84  Once released into the environment, the spread of the protected genetic 
material is highly likely to occur beyond the initial seed/plant and indeed beyond the 
intended area – especially without the availability of effective bioconfinement 
mechanisms. 85  It is difficult, if not impossible, and costly to undertake to avoid 
admixture or to remove plants that demonstrate a patented trait – a trait that may also 
only manifest after considerable time and investment of resources. Yet the patent still 
applies equally to relevant crops grown by third party farmers.  
 
Within the EU, the focus of the patent on the genetically modified trait within the 
plant enables the patent protection to attach to the plant’s progeny also86 that retain 
the patented trait, even where the progeny are not identical or even substantially 
similar. Whilst such inherited IPRs may make little difference to a farmer who has 
purchased the original seed or plant (as already affected by the relevant legislation 
and technology use agreements), this can have profound impacts upon other farmers 
and the diversity of seed supply. As intention is irrelevant to whether there is patent 
infringement or not, a third party farmer can save and exchange seed in good faith but 
may then find out that they are liable and any infringement may lead to being sued for 
                                                        
84  E.g. National Research Council, Biological Confinement of Genetically Engineered Crops, 
(Washington DC, The National Academies Press, 2004), 24, 34 and 56. 
85 Marvier and Van Acker, “Can crop transgenes be kept on a leash?”, 3 Frontiers in Ecology and the 
Environment (2005), 99. 
86 Article 8 of the EU Biotech Directive. A comparable approach is taken in both the United States 
(Bowman) and Canada (Schmeiser). 
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damages or the uprooting of crops. 87 Further, even in the EU where the Biotech 
Directive provides for slightly greater flexibility regarding patents over seeds, the 
exemptions available to farmers who purchased the initial patented seeds/plants do 
not appear to cover third parties.88 Unadjusted, patenting in the context of admixture 
can be especially severe on third party farmers.89 
 
The danger is that farmers face substantial economic risks if they undertake normal 
farming practices and thereby breach a patent, even unknowingly. They might 
therefore alter their behaviour and no longer save or exchange seed, even though their 
own current crops are not patented. Thus, where patents and PVP apply in the United 
States, practices of seed-saving and exchange are prohibited 90  and have 
predominately died out.91 These same farmers might even go so far as to purchase the 
patented seeds, as they still face the costs of repeat purchases but without the benefit 
of the ‘improved’ crops – furthering a monoculture approach. The result is profound 
for agri-sustainability: not only is access to the existing diversity controlled, but the 
opportunities for further development of diversity on-farm are reduced.  
 
Overall GM challenges for Agri-sustainability 
 
Consequently, the primary challenge for agri-sustainability posed by GM crops as a 
whole is situated in the legal constructs, rather than in their make-up. Although IPRs 
can encourage and facilitate research by protecting its economic viability,92 which can 
clearly increase seed diversity and supply, the capture of IP law undermines genetic 
diversity. The difficulty arises from a generic patenting system that does not take into 
account the nature of living organisms in the environment, traditional farming 
practices, the challenges for both traditional and modern breeding, and the urgent 
need for agrobiodiversity. Seed-saving and exchange, research by secondary breeders 
and actual access to the genetic diversity are simultaneously hindered. Considering 
the availability of alternatives to patenting, e.g. through sui generis systems,93 open 
source supplies,94 promoting on-farm diversity/breeding95 and public research,96 it is 
questionable whether the application of patenting as it currently operates is justified.97  
                                                         
87 Patent holders may decide not to enforce such a right, as Monsanto promised in America where the 
infringement was unintentional and under 1%: Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association et al. v 
Monsanto, Supreme Court of the United States, No.13-303, 13 January 2014, 
http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/opinions-orders/12-1298.Opinion.6-6-2013.1.PDF.). 
Nonetheless, this does not provide protection where farmers are aware of the possibility of admixture 
or where it goes above 1%.  
88 Lee and Burrell, op. cit. supra note7, 524-5. 
89 Lee and Burrell, op. cit. supra note7, 519-523. It is of course arguable that all farmers should have to 
pay a nominal fee to companies for any financial benefit that they accrue relative to what they might 
otherwise have obtained. 
90 Heinemann et al, op. cit. supra note46, 82. 
91  Mascarenhas, and Busch, “Seeds of change: intellectual property rights, genetically modified 
soybeans and seed saving in the United States”, 46 Sociologia ruralis (2006), 46, at 122–138. 
92 Van Acker, Szumgalski and Friesen, “The potential benefits, risks and costs of genetic use restriction 
technologies”, Canadian Journal of Plant Science (2007) 753. 
93 Article 27(3) TRIPS. 
94 Kloppenburg, “Impeding Dispossession, Enabling Repossession: Biological Open Source and the 
Recovery of Seed Sovereignty”, 10:3 Journal of Agrarian Change (2010), 367. 
95 Heinemann et al, op. cit. supra note46, 84. 
96 Heinemann et al, op. cit. supra note46, 84-5. 
97 Heinemann et al, op. cit. supra note46, 74 et seq. 
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However, this is the approach that exists at the EU level and, in light of the on-going 
controversy and debates surrounding GM crops, it is unlikely that any significant 
legislative changes will be developed in the near future due to the level of political 
agreement required amongst the Member States to amend the EU regime.98 Indeed, 
the recent European Patent Office decisions strengthen the EU’s patenting regime 
over living organisms.99 The question thereby arises as to whether States are able to 
respond unilaterally to these challenges in order to protect agri-sustainability. 100 
Specifically, in light of the limited scope of the existing mechanisms, can the new 
Directive 2015/412 facilitate such action by the EU Member States? In this respect, 
the very potential for enclosure of the plants’ genetic material via patenting may be its 
own downfall, as pushing the balance too far in favour of the large seed companies 
and private ownership. 
 
4. Restrictions under EU law: Directive 2015/412, agri-sustainability and indirect 
environmental protection 
The EU GM regime is highly harmonised, with limited flexibility for Member States 
to make unilateral policy decisions. The general stance towards GM crops (authorise 
if safe) is pre-determined at the EU level and the authorisation process itself is 
typically undertaken and concluded at the EU level. Member States are predominately 
left to implement and enforce the regime, rather than with core policy-making 
powers,101 and must not create obstacles to the free movement of authorised crops 
except in accordance with EU law. However, three limited mechanisms exist that 
might enable Member States to restrict or prohibit GM crops where necessary to 
protect and promote agri-sustainability, with the key one being that of Article 26b of 
Directive 2001/18 as inserted by Directive 2015/412. It is worth noting briefly that, 
prior to April 2015, the two main mechanisms enabling unilateral Member State 
action were safeguard clauses and the coexistence clause.  
 
Safeguard clauses enable Member States to act swiftly, unilaterally and provisionally 
in order to protect against environmental or health risks. The main relevant safeguard 
clauses are found within Article 23 of Directive 2001/18, Article 34 of Regulation 
1829/2003 102 and Article 114(5) TFEU. If interpreted broadly, these could easily 
facilitate restrictions related to agri-sustainability, as genetic diversity in agriculture 
also promotes a range of habitats for wildlife, broader biodiversity and environmental 
sustainability. However, these are narrow in scope and have been interpreted and 
controlled restrictively by the Commission and the European Court of Justice,103 to 
the point that they are of limited application and of little help regarding the issue of 
agri-sustainability. Crucially, all three would require new scientific evidence of a risk 
to the environment posed by the GM crop, rather than for instance a reassessment of                                                         
98 Lee and Burrell, op. cit. supra note7, 525. For instance, the introduction of Article 26b was first 
proposed officially by the European Commission in 2010, went through intensive negotiations and took 
until 2015 to come to fruition. 
99 See the “Tomato II” and “Broccoli II” decisions, op. cit. supra note79. 
100 It should be noted that unilateral national action could impact on the level of EU agreement also, by 
paving the way for other Member States to follow. 
101 Lee, “The Ambiguity of Multi-Level Governance and (De-)Harmonisation in EU Environmental 
Law”, 15 CYELS (2012), 357; and Dobbs, op. cit. supra note14.  
102 Regulation 1829/2003/EC on genetically modified food and feed, O.J. 2003, L 268/1. 
103 E.g. Joined Cases C-58/10 to C-68/10 Monsanto SAS and Others v Ministre de l’Agriculture et de la 
Peche, [2011] ECR I-7763; Weimer, op. cit. supra note24; and Dobbs op. cit. supra note14, 15-17. 
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existing evidence despite the applicability of the precautionary principle. This is due 
to the level of harmonisation of the area, with the CJEU recently stating that in light 
of the EU legislation’s objective of ‘avoiding artificial disparities in the treatment of a 
serious risk, the assessment and management of a serious and evident risk ultimately 
come under the sole responsibility of the Commission and the Council, subject to 
review by the European Union Courts.’ 104  Whilst discussing sister legislation to 
Directive 2001/18, the same logic would be greatly applicable. 
 
The coexistence clause (Article 26a of Directive 2001/18) enables Member States to 
develop ex ante or ex post measures to protect farmers that would be affected 
detrimentally by admixture of GM and non-GM crops occurring. Such measures are 
important, but they are of limited use to States in this context due to their inherent 
focus on managing admixture and favouring of one agri-type over the other.105 They 
could encompass measures to minimise the chances of admixture, thereby preventing 
the spread of patenting controls. Alternatively the measures could aim to impose the 
financial and legal responsibility of any admixture on GM farmers and potentially 
even on the seed companies. However, either scenario is not wholly favourable to the 
development of genetic diversity. Where ex ante measures aim to prevent admixture 
of neighbouring crops via outcrossing, this undermines the development of on-farm 
diversity. Where admixture occurs but ex post measures are present, this still does not 
prevent seed companies enforcing their IPRs and demanding the uprooting of any 
crops containing patented genes. Further, in light of the insulation that seed 
companies grant themselves through their user agreements,106 the financial risks and 
costs will lie on whichever farmer is responsible for preventing admixture and they 
may find the costs too burdensome and decide not to cultivate their crops at all. The 
other main challenge is that the measures are tied to the economic impact upon 
farmers and it is doubtful that an outright prohibition based on Article 26a would be 
justifiable beyond the EU. 
 
This brings us to the new possibilities for unilateral action by Member States based on 
Article 26b of Directive 2001/18.107 Article 26b provides Member States with two 
options, enabling them to demand a geographical restriction (via the Commission) 
from the notifier of the request for authorisation of the GM crop during the (re-
)authorisation process108 and/or unilaterally impose such a geographical restriction at 
any time. For the first time since the EU commenced regulating GM cultivation, 
Member States have a real possibility of ‘opting-out’. However, the basis for any 
restrictions must be carefully considered and supported. 
 
The first option under Article 26b appears the easy option for Member States, as all 
that is required of the Member States is a simple request. However, it is a weak 
instrument, as this request must be communicated via the Commission within a                                                         
104 Joined Cases C-58/10 to C68/10 Monsanto SAS and Others v Ministre del’Agriculture et de la 
Pêche, [2011] ECR I-7763, [78]. 
105  Dobbs, “Excluding coexistence of GMOs? The impact of the EU Commission’s 2010 
Recommendation on coexistence”, 20 RECIEL (2011), 180, at 192-3. 
106 E.g. supra note67. 
107 Dobbs, “Co-existence of GMOs in the EU – A Veritable Choice for Whom?” in McMahon and 
Cardwell (eds), Research Handbook on EU Agriculture Law (Edward Elgar 2015), 357-363; and 
Dobbs op. cit. supra note14, 264-65.  
108 If the notifier does not refuse the demand, then the (re-)authorisation application will automatically 
be adjusted to reflect the restriction. 
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relatively brief time period and success depends upon the notifiers’ consent. The 
notifiers acceded to all relevant requests by 19 of the 28 Member States during the 
transitional period, 109  but notifiers may refuse such requests in the future. 110 
Consequently, although the first option is something simple and useful for Member 
States wishing to restrict GM cultivation, they will still need to consider whether they 
wish to avail of the second option and, if so, how. Further, a developed framework or 
policy for implementing the second option could also strengthen any requests under 
the first option – if States have clearly expressed that they will use the second option 
and have well-formulated grounds for doing so, why would notifiers fight the 
inevitable?  
 
The second option poses a greater challenge for Member States initially – any 
unilateral measures must aim to fulfil a legitimate objective in a proportionate and 
non-discriminatory manner.111 Article 26b(3) only outlines six independent objectives 
alongside a supporting seventh objective of public policy, but significantly this is a 
non-exhaustive list. Consequently, flexibility exists if Member States can demonstrate 
the relevance of a legitimate objective generally and in particular for that Member 
State.112 However, the question remains as to whether the provision is sufficiently 
flexible to encompass measures targeted at protecting and promoting agri-
sustainability. 
 
Focussing on those objectives already listed within Article 26b(3), two require brief 
mention as potentially viable mechanisms. The first is prevention of admixture, which 
clearly aims to supplement Article 26a coexistence measures noted above. It is 
similarly of import, but does not fully support agri-sustainability. The second is public 
morality and provides a possibility for some unilateral action.113 However, the State 
must demonstrate that the measures are actually necessary due to public mores, which 
has proven challenging in the past – what evidence can establish this as fact?114 
Further, national policy may be inconsistent and undermine any claims of necessity, 
e.g. if the State does not always seek to prohibit all GM crops115 or if they treat 
similar crops differently, e.g. upgraded crops or indeed other crops subject to patents                                                         
109 See http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/gmo/authorisation/cultivation/geographical_scope_en.htm.  
110  It in principle would also be open to the notifiers and Member States to engage in negotiations, e.g. 
for notifiers to agree to a limited geographical restriction in return for a vote in favour of authorisation. 
This raises important questions over whether such negotiations are appropriate, e.g. Greenpeace, ‘EU 
Parliament to adopt new GM crop national opt-out law’, 12 January 2015, available at: 
http://www.greenpeace.org/eu-unit/Global/eu-unit/reports-
briefings/2015/GMOs%20briefing%2012012015%20%20FINAL.pdf; and Achterberg, “How to 
establish GMO cultivation bans”, Greenpeace presentation at GMO-Free Europe Conference 2015, 
Berlin, 7th May 2015, slides available at: http://www.gmo-free-regions.org/fileadmin/files/gmo-free-
europe/How_to_establish_GMO_cultivation_bans_by_Franziska_Achterberg.pdf. However, the 
process does not automatically facilitate this and indications suggest that the Member States will not 
engage in such negotiations. Of all the Member States and regional representatives spoken to in 
undertaking this research (n18), one indicated the possibility of negotiating with the notifiers but 
concluded that it was not something that would happen in practice. 
111 Poli “The Commission’s New Approach to the Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms”, 1 
EJRR (2010), 339, at 342-3; and Lee, op. cit., supra note11, 246. 
112 On a practical note, to establish the sincerity and relevance of their arguments, Member States will 
need to be consistent at both EU and WTO levels – which limits the range of justifications available. 
113 Dobbs, “Legalising General Prohibitions on Cultivation of Genetically Modified Organisms”,  11 
GLJ (2010), 1347. 
114 Case C-165/08 Commission v Poland [2009] ECR I-6843. 
115 Dobbs, op. cit. supra note107, 355. 
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in this context. This could become more challenging in the future if an EU proposal to 
permit restrictions on GM food and feed 116 is adopted and the Member State in 
question does not avail of it – whilst distinct policies can legitimately exist, as related 
to another form of GMO, it would indicate an apparently arbitrary approach that 
would need to be satisfactorily explained.117  
 
However, the main focus here is on the possibility of availing of a combination of 
listed Article 26b(3) grounds relating to agricultural and environmental policy 
objectives, alongside land use and socio-economic impacts. These grounds are closely 
intertwined with the issues of agri-sustainability and agrobiodiversity. Further, the list 
in Article 26b(3) is non-exhaustive. Consequently, Article 26b(3) would seem to 
encompass these issues readily enough. This is also supported by the EU’s 
recognition of the significance of agri-sustainability and agrobiodiversity, as noted 
above.118 However, the provision may still raise further challenges, as it expressly 
limits the potential for States to rely on environmental policy objectives. 
 
As mentioned, the EU GM regime is highly harmonised and environmental issues are 
meant to be raised and dealt with during the authorisation process, including through 
attaching authorisation conditions. Although it is arguable that there should be greater 
powers at the national and regional levels regarding environmental and health risks,119 
this is currently not the case. Whilst Article 26b(3) provides some flexibility in this 
regard, any measures relating to ‘environmental policy objectives’ must not conflict 
with the environmental risk assessment carried out in accordance with the EU 
legislation. Considering that the environmental risk assessment is a fundamental step 
in the EU authorisation of any GM crops, this might appear like a significant 
stumbling bock. 
 
However, the key point to make is that the focus of such measures is on agri-
sustainability and agrobiodiversity, rather than on environmental risks or concerns 
directly. The concerns in question relate to agriculture and broader societal issues of 
food security, food sovereignty and agri-sustainability. Whilst these link in to 
environmental considerations, they are not subsumed by them and remain distinct. 
Thereby, even if environmental policy objectives are effectively excluded, this does 
not prevent a Member State relying upon the remaining listed objectives (and other 
relevant objectives) to promote agri-sustainability and agrobiodiversity. Provided that 
the Member States can demonstrate that the issue is important to their own State and 
that the measures are necessary to attain their legitimate objectives, without acting in 
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner, it would appear that they could take such 
measures in compliance with EU law. 
                                                         
116 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the Council amending Regulation (EC) 
No 1829/2003 as regards the possibility for the Member States to restrict or prohibit the use of 
genetically modified food and feed on their territory COM/2015/0177 final - 2015/0093 (COD). This 
can be seen as the logical next step following on from Directive 2015/412, since these are also GM and 
also are a controversial and political topic. However, different issues and objectives arise that will 
make its progression uncertain and varied. 
117  Dobbs, “Can you really be GM-free? Why new European laws pose a moral dilemma”, The 
Conversation, 24 April 2015, available at https://theconversation.com/can-you-really-be-gm-free-why-
new-european-laws-pose-a-moral-dilemma-40712.  
118 Supra note1-3. 
119 Lee, op cit. supra note111, 230-1, 234 and 236; and Dobbs, op. cit. supra note14, Section 4.1. 
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Whilst it could be argued that strict coexistence measures preventing admixture under 
either Article 26a or 26b would suffice and therefore be more proportionate than an 
outright prohibition, and such logic might follow for protecting the economic interests 
of non-GM farmers initially, this does not work from the perspective of agri-
sustainability. The prohibition of such crops contrasts with admixture controls in two 
key ways. It not only encourages those who have chosen to cultivate patented seeds to 
choose from other seeds with lesser legal protection, breaking the patent cycle, but 
also enables other third parties to grow crops and save seeds as they can cross-
pollinate from their neighbours’ crops without concern over legal obligations being 
imposed upon them unilaterally. Consequently, it would seem feasible that the 
Member States could avail of Article 26b to prohibit unilaterally the cultivation of 
GM crops within their territories on the basis that they contain plant material subject 
to patents. However, EU law is not the end of the story and Member States will have 
to consider other commitments and specifically WTO law.  
 
5. Compliance with WTO Law 
As highlighted by the Biotech Dispute,120 WTO law is of great significance to the EU 
and indirectly therefore to the Member States. Non-EU Contracting Parties can 
challenge measures by the EU and its Member States, encompassing both Article 26b 
and the national measures permitted by it, before the WTO dispute bodies. 
Furthermore, interested third parties similarly may be able to challenge these 
measures in other fora via agreements such as the Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. Even if the 
challenge relates to Article 26b and the EU Commission’s approach to enforcing it, 
this could have a knock-on effect upon the Member States’ use of the provision. 
Consequently, it is a sensible position for the Member States (and others thinking of 
acting similarly) to ensure that their measures comply with WTO law if feasible.  
 
However, Member States may be able to avail of Article 26b whilst avoiding WTO 
law entirely. WTO law is aimed at State action,121 where the State action imposes an 
obligation or detrimental effect upon a third party. Although the first option under 
Article 26b does involve a ‘demand’ by the Member States, the notifiers may refuse 
any requested geographical restriction without obvious legal consequence. 
Consequently, if notifiers agree to self-impose geographical limitations, as was done 
for the transitional measures in 2015, this should technically avoid WTO law.122  
 
Problems for the Member States arise where the notifiers do not simply agree to the 
demand and there is no guarantee that they will do so each and every time in the 
future – especially if the Member States overall do not take a stance more favourable 
to them regarding EU authorisations or national safeguard measures. Three resulting 
scenarios where there is ‘sufficient governmental involvement’ could trigger WTO 
law:123 firstly, if the notifiers do not respond to the request, as this automatically leads 
to a geographical restriction of the authorisation application; secondly, if Member                                                         
120 Supra note15. 
121 Argentina - Measures affecting the export of bovine hides and the import of finished leather (19 
December 2000), WT/DS155/R, [11.18]. 
122 Dobbs, op. cit. supra note14, 264. 
123  Japan – Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper (31 March 1998) 
WT/DS44/R, [10.56].  
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States were to negotiate with the notifiers regarding the scope of the restrictions under 
the first option; and thirdly, if Member States move to the second option and impose 
unilateral restrictions/prohibitions. In each of these, significant governemental 
involvement would be triggering the restriction. Whilst representatives of several 
Member States and regions have indicated that they will not enter negotiations with 
the notifiers,124 notifiers may not respond and Member States currently are attempting 
to formulate clear plans for implementing the second option as noted above. 
Consequently, it is of fundamental importance for the Member States and the EU as a 
whole to consider in what circumstances restrictions or prohibitions in part(s) or the 
entirety of a State may be justified. 
 
Where States impose a de jure or de facto prohibition of patentable crops or crops 
subject to similar IP protection, and therefore currently GM crops, this will be deemed 
a quantitative restriction which is prohibited under Article XI of the General 
Agreement on Trade Tariffs (GATT).125 Such quantitative restrictions can only be 
justified where the measures correspond to an exhaustive list of relatively narrow 
objectives in Article XX of GATT and comply with the chapeau requirements. Of 
greatest relevance to the issue of agri-sustainability and patenting of GM crops is 
Article XX(g) on exhaustible natural resources (ENRs). 126 
 
Article XX(g) permits quantitative restrictions where they relate to the conservation 
of ENRs.127 The first challenge is to establish that plant genetic material and diversity 
is an ENR and thereby falls within the scope of Article XX(g). This appears a simple 
task in light of the discussion of agri-sustainability and genetic diversity loss, but 
much depends on the provision’s interpretation.  
 
The concept of ENRs within Article XX(g) has gone through a number of 
transformations since it was initially introduced. However, there remains no clear 
definition or set of parameters delineating what may fall within or outside the scope 
of this concept.128 The Dispute Panel has even stated that it considers it unnecessary 
to establish the ‘precise meaning or scope’ of ENRs.129 Consequently, a case-by-case 
approach applies and will continue for the foreseeable future.130 Nonetheless, some 
guidance is available. 
                                                         
124 Supra note110. 
125 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1867 UNTS 187. 
126 Technically, States could argue that their measures are justified under Article XX(a) on public 
morality (Dobbs, op. cit. supra note107, 360.), but this will pose similar challenges as at the EU level 
and specifically the issue must be relevant to that State’s mores. Alternatively, States could attempt to 
rely upon Article XX(b) on the environment if consistent with the arguments proffered at the EU level. 
Whilst this could be tied in to the arguments on agri-sustainability, via consideration of biodiversity 
and the ecosystem more generally, this would entail further complications as it would lead to the 
application of the Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Agreement, 1867 UNTS 493, and the need for a risk 
assessment: Scott, The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures – A Commentary 
(OUP   2009) and especially v-x and 76–138; and Lee, EU Regulation of GMOs: Law and Decision 
Making for a New Technology (Edward Elgar   2008), 211–22.    
127 van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 
(CUP, 2013) 610-4. 
128 Ghori, “An Epic Mess: ‘Exhaustible Natural Resources’ and the Future of Export Restraints After 
the China – Rare Earths Decision”, 16 Melbourne Journal of International Law (2015) 1, at 18-19. 
129 [7.250]; and Ghori op. cit. supra note128, 19. 
130 Ghori op. cit. supra note128, 23-4. 
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A narrow interpretation was clearly feasible, e.g. through focussing upon the 
resources’ economic value, 131  but a broader approach was taken to encompass 
ecological value also.132 Significantly, it was also arguable that ENRs were limited to 
non-renewable resources, such as oil,  in light of the use of the term ‘exhaustible’ and 
the drafters’ original intentions,133 as was contended in US – Gasoline,134 and also in 
US – Shrimp.135 In US – Gasoline, the Panel side-stepped the issue by considering 
that clean air had a value and could be depleted and that any measures designed to 
prevent or minimise the depletion of clean air related to the conservation of natural 
resources and fell within the scope of Article XX(g).136  
 
In US – Shrimp, the Appellate Body concluded that ENRs were not limited to non-
renewable resources as the concept was not static but evolutionary.137 It could thereby 
embrace both living and non-living organisms. 138  In order to determine whether 
something fell within the scope, the Body considered that it was necessary to read the 
provision in light of the ‘contemporary concerns… about the protection and 
conservation of the environment’,139 including sustainable development.140 Thereby, 
the WTO Agreement’s preamble could act as an interpretative tool, by adding ‘colour, 
texture and shading’,141 as could other international documents such as CITES.142  
 
Part of the reasoning for the evolutionary approach and flexible interpretation of 
ENRs is the ever-changing situation regarding the environment and organisms – 
something whose existence is not threatened today may be endangered tomorrow and 
vice versa. Just because something is ‘renewable’ does not mean it is impervious to 
exhaustion, as confirmed by ‘modern biological sciences’. 143  Although criticism 
exists regarding the expansive interpretation, 144  it helps counter any potential 
preference towards free trade when balancing it with global environmental 
concerns.145 
 
                                                        
131 McDonald, “Greening the GATT: Harmonizing Free Trade and Environmental Protection in the 
New World Order”, 23:2 Environmental law (1993) 12, at 46. 
132  Condon, Environmental Sovereignty and the WTO: Trade Sanctions and International Law 
(Transnational Publishers, 2006), 1. 
133 Cheyne, “Gateways to the Precautionary Principle in WTO Law”, 19:2 Journal of Environmental 
Law (2007) 155, at 163-4. 
134 Panel Report, US — Gasoline, WT/DS2/R, [6.36]. 
135 WT/DS58/AB/R, [128]. 
136 [6.37]. 
137 [130]. 
138 [130]. 
139 [129]. 
140 [152-3]. 
141 [153] and [155]. 
142 Stuart, “Trade and Environment: A Mutually Supportive Interpretation of WTO Agreements in light 
of Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 12 New Zealand Journal of Public International Law 
(2014) 379, at 401-3. 
143 US – Shrimp, [128]. 
144  Abboud, “The WTO's Committee on Trade and Environment: Reconciling GATT 1994 with 
Unilateral Trade-Related Environmental Measures”, European Environmental Law Review (2000), 
147. 
145 Howse, “The Appellate Body Rulings in the Shrimp/Turtle Case: A New Legal Baseline for the 
Trade and Environment Debate”, 27 Colum. J. Envtl. L (2002), 491. 
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The WTO’s evolutionary approach and indications that renewable, living organisms, 
including turtles, fish stocks and dolphins, 146  can be ENRs, provides significant 
flexibility. 147  It seems feasible that plant material 148  and genetic diversity could 
similarly fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Indeed, Bentley has argued that non-
GM varieties could be considered as ENRs. 149  However, is plant material and 
specifically plant genetic diversity truly ‘exhaustible’?  
 
In US – Shrimp, the presence of turtles in the list of endangered species in CITES was 
noted as a significant factor.150 Yet, plant genetic diversity is clearly still capable of 
depletion and can become endangered. As noted above, significant genetic diversity 
loss has already occurred and is likely to continue unless conservation measures are 
taken. Hence, it has been argued that land produce (amongst other things) are 
‘[l]imited and exhaustible natural resources’ which ‘should be considered as a 
patrimony or capital and not as goods’. 151  Irrespective of whether plant genetic 
material and diversity is labelled officially as ‘endangered’ or ‘exhaustible’, it is clear 
that this significant resource is being threatened by both our practices and legal 
systems, and therefore should fall within the scope of Article XX(g). Indeed, the 
Appellate Body in US – Shrimp had already effectively concluded that the turtles 
were exhaustible152 and merely availed of CITES to support their position, i.e. their 
endangered status under CITES was not the decisive factor in and of itself.153 
 
Provided that plant genetic material and/or the diversity thereof is an ENR, the States 
must then demonstrate that the measures relate to the conservation of these resources. 
Unlike with other headings under Article XX there is no requirement of being 
‘necessary’. This leads to a more flexible criterion, 154  potentially ‘because any 
measure that limits the depletion of a natural resource is justified per se.’155 Provided 
that the measures are ‘reasonably related’ to conservation of ENRs and such a 
relationship is a ‘close and real one’, this will suffice.156 Furthermore, in contrast with 
Article XI:2(a), the focus is conservation and not just limited to where there are 
critical shortages.157 Thus, seemingly any measures that aim directly or indirectly at 
conserving natural resources fall within the provision’s scope.158 
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However, the measures must still comply with Article XX’s chapeau,159 which seeks 
to protect other States’ rights and helps avoid misuse or abuse of the justifications.160 
The chapeau requires that any measures must not be ‘applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between 
countries’ or ‘a disguised restriction on international trade’. 161  Consequently,if 
countries with the same conditions are treated differently, if there is no real possibility 
for monitoring and evaluting the appropriateness of the application of the measures to 
individual countries or if the measures are rigid and inflexible irrespective of the 
circumstances, then this may amount to unjustifiable discrimination.162 Similarly, a 
lack of adequate due process, e.g. a lack of transparency and procedural fairness in the 
administration of the measure, may amount to arbitrary discrimination.163 
 
This chapeau has teeth and is not merely a symbolic consideration. Thus, the initial 
American measures in US – Shrimp were found to be discriminatory under the 
chapeau and not justified, even though the measures fell within the expansive 
interpretation of Article XX(g). The USA subsequently adjusted their regime and 
their later measures were challenged and upheld as compliant with the chapeau.164  
 
Bentley has considered that, whilst non-GM crops may be an ENR, the cultivation of 
new GM crops is much like the introduction of any other new plant into the 
environment – there is no justification for special treatment. 165  However, the 
argument here is not focussing upon the genetic modification per se, but the 
subsequent legal consequences in particular. It is to justify measures restricting the 
cultivation of crops subject to patenting or other similar IP protection. Provided that 
States applied an equivalent approach to crops subject to similar protection, then such 
measures would not be obviously arbitrarily discriminatory. 
 
However, the successful application of Article XX does not negate the application of 
other international law. The obvious other sources are TRIPS and UPOV, which are at 
the heart of enclosure. Whilst a thorough investigation of compliance with these 
agreements is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that Article 27(3) of 
TRIPS does not actually require patents for plants. It permits States to exclude 
patenting for plants and ‘essentially biological processes’, other than microorganisms 
and ‘non-biological and microbiological processes’. Protection for plant varieties is 
required, but this can be via an effective sui generis system. Consequently, a sui 
generis system with low-level protection for breeders/inventors as undertaken in India 
and the Philippines, 166  alongside patenting for microorganisms (not incorporated 
within a plant) and the relevant processes would seem to suffice from the perspective                                                         
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of international obligations. Where these are present, a prohibition on plant patents 
and on patents on microorganisms within plants would seem to comply with Article 
27(3) TRIPS. 
 
6. Conclusion  
GM crops are not inherently ‘evil’ or threatening to agri-sustainability. They have the 
potential to provide significant advantages regarding agri-sustainability, e.g. through 
facilitating cultivation in otherwise inhospitable locations, through reducing the need 
for pesticides and through increasing genetic diversity. However, they do 
simultaneously pose our society with numerous challenges and dilemmas, not least 
because of the potential for enclosure. 
 
Whilst patented crops are only subject to limited cultivation in the EU currently, the 
patenting system and the experiences in the United States hint at the potential 
consequences for agri-sustainability if they take hold. Through IP law, corporations 
are able to effect the legal enclosure of seeds, making seed-saving, seed exchange and 
secondary breeding more challenging. Legal enclosure thereby can impact negatively 
on the practical, day-to-day biodiversity – which is already affected by changing 
farming practices and the rise of monocultures. Thus, the spread of patented seeds 
threatens agri-sustainability, as well as food security and sovereignty, even whilst 
potentially improving individual crop yields or quality.  
 
Enclosure’s impact on agri-sustainability therefore both demands and justifies legal 
action to control the use of GM crops – not because they are GM per se, but because 
of the associated attributes. The potential threats to agriculture and society necessitate 
a contestation of legal enclosure of seeds as a whole and not merely over individual 
ownership claims. This might be through considering the development of specific sui 
generis systems, open source systems or even publicly funded resources. However, 
Member States are limited in their ability to make significant changes to the European 
or global approach to IPRs regarding plants in the immediate future and, whilst the 
WTO facilitates a spectrum of approaches by Contracting Parties in implementing 
TRIPS and UPOV, its default is nonetheless a neoliberal approach with the balance in 
favour of the IPR holder. Similarly, whilst the EU has adopted some limited 
protection for farmers and other breeders, indicating an element of paternalism, it 
nonetheless retains the neoliberal theme.167 Member States can however take some 
limited action within their own territories. 
 
Article 26b of Directive 2001/18 provides the Member States with a mechanism to 
counteract this threat to agri-sustainability, through focussing on grounds such as 
those relating to agricultural policy objectives. They could prohibit the cultivation of 
GM and other crops subject to patenting or other similarly restrictive IPRs on the 
basis of protecting agri-sustainability. Furthermore, such measures could 
simultaneously be justified under Article XX(g) by focussing on the nature of genetic 
material and specifically genetic diversity as an ENR. There is no guarantee that these 
justifications will be accepted at the EU or WTO levels, but there are strong 
arguments to support such an approach. 
                                                         
167  This is of particular interest considering the EU’s somewhat more precautionary, paternalistic 
approach to risk regulation in relation to authorisation of GM crops. 
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A final reflection seems warranted. Restricting GM cultivation is not a panacea for 
ensuring agri-sustainability – indeed, if society can re-take control and adapt the way 
in which GM crops are governed, they may play a positive role instead. However, 
GM crops highlight the broader significance of protecting agri-sustainability, 
developing resilience and attempting to counter monocultures at all levels. A more 
holistic and purposive approach is required, which considers whether we need to 
undertake a fundamental overhaul of our governance of food production to ensure 
sustainability and how this might be achieved. 
 
